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CIVIL FORFEITURE, CUSTOMS LAW,
AND THE RECOVERY OF CULTURAL
PROPERTY
I. INTRODUCTION
An 18-carat bookmark that once belonged to Adolf Hitler;
two paintings worth $150 million that were allegedly involved in
bank fraud schemes; six ancient artifacts looted from Iraq; a silver
pendant bearing the image of Peter the Great, stolen from a Rus-
sian museum. These are examples of cultural property works
seized by United States customs authorities in recent years.' And,
as long as the United States remains a lucrative destination for the-
se types of goods, these examples will only expand in number and
prominence. As such, the United States Government will be in-
creasingly tasked with intercepting and forfeiting these works to
their rightful owners. It will do so under a series of codified laws
and procedures, the intricacies and uncertainties of which will
form the basis of this article.
For much of the history of customs law, provisions have
existed under the United States Code for the seizure and forfeiture
of materials introduced illegally into the United States. These pro-
visions include a wide range of sections under a number of statutes
of the United States Code. Forfeiture laws apply to personal prop-
erty used in the commission of crimes, such as automobiles, boats,
currency, and electronics. Forfeiture of goods introduced in viola-
tion of law serves a vital end objective of separating wrongdoers
from both the means of committing and the proceeds accruing
from those violations of law.
These provisions also apply - in a rather interesting and
exceptional way - to works of cultural property, such as paintings,
sculptures, and archaeological remnants. As an example, the ex-
ceptional treatment of cultural property under forfeiture laws is
demonstrated by the fact that lack of non-cultural property case
law where the forfeiture provision of the customs statute (19
See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Fact Sheet, Cultural
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U.S.C. § 1595a) is combined with the National Stolen Property
Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315) to forfeit works entering the coun-
try. Whether such treatment is simply coincidental, or perhaps the
product of something closer to design, will be the focus of the fol-
lowing inquiry. The purpose of this article is to provide an over-
view on the customs forfeiture statute, Section 1595a, and to ex-
amine some areas in which application of this provision is unclear
as it applies to forfeiture of cultural property works.
This article will begin with a summary of forfeiture statutes
generally, as well as those used specifically in cultural property
forfeitures, with specific emphasis on 19 U.S.C. §1595a (hereinaf-
ter "Section 1595a") of the customs statute and its development
throughout the twentieth century. It will then examine seminal or
representative case law under these statutes involving both cultural
property and non-cultural property cases and will analyze similari-
ties and differences in treatment by the courts of these types of
property under Section 1595a.
This article will then examine specific areas in which the
law is either unsettled or unclear on these forfeiture provisions.
The first such issue examined will be the applicable burden of
proof under Section 1595a, including both the initial burden on the
Government to seize property and the pleading burden on the
Government when pursuing forfeiture in federal court. The second
issue addressed will be the possibility of a knowledge, or scienter,
requirement under Section 1595a and the availability of an inno-
cent-owner defense under this provision.
This article will then examine whether the National Stolen
Property Act encompasses something other than "theft," and
whether Section 1595a can encompass the law of a foreign nation
in lieu of the National Stolen Property Act. The final issues exam-
ined will address whether, as a matter of policy, Section 1595a
should be used only in concert with an ongoing criminal investiga-
tion, and whether the United States Attorneys' use of Section
1595a in cultural property forfeitures is proper.
This article will conclude by summarizing the state of the
law in this area and will offer several proposals for amendment or
reform in order to further clarify areas of abuse or uncertainty.
336
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II. THE MECHANICS OF FORFEITURE PROCEDURES
This article will begin with an introduction into general for-
feiture procedure, with an emphasis on Title 19, Section 1595a of
the United States Code. In the United States Code, a number of
statutes exist containing forfeiture provisions. Each statute's pro-
visions are unique from that of another. Some statutes seek to re-
cover the actual subject matter of a crime (e.g., illicit narcotics), 2
some permit confiscation of the instrumentality of a crime (e.g.,
the gun used in a murder),3 some target categories of property used
to aid in a crime (e.g., an aircraft used to smuggle narcotics),4 and
some target the actual proceeds of a crime (e.g., currency). 5 Re-
gardless of the means employed by a forfeiture statute, however,
two overarching goals underlie all such provisions: (1) separating
the wrongdoer from the property or proceeds linked to a crime,
and (2) returning the subject property either to its rightful place or
to the Government.
6
A. Types of Forfeiture Provisions
Procedures for forfeiture also vary considerably across the
types of forfeiture statutes. Three broad types of forfeiture actions
are available under federal law: (1) administrative, (2) civil, and
(3) criminal. Administrative forfeiture is undertaken by a federal
agency, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) or
the Bureau of Customs & Border Protection (CBP), and requires
only notice of seizure and notice of a forfeiture hearing to be held
within a specified period of time, usually 35 days. If no claimant
contests forfeiture before the expiration of the 35-day period, the
property is forfeited and the relevant agency becomes its legal
owner without the matter ever reaching court.
7
2 18 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(1) (2012).
' Id. § 924(d)(1).
4 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2012).
' 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C).
6 Stefan D. Cassella, Using the Forfeiture Laws to Protect Archaeologi-
cal Resources, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 129, 130 (2004).7Id. at 131-32.
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Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding in which the government
files a complaint against the property itself in federal court. 8 Civil
forfeiture often results when a claimant in an administrative forfei-
ture proceeding contests forfeiture. In civil forfeiture proceedings,
the Government can confiscate property regardless of whether the
property was owned by the wrongdoer or by some third party, il-
lustrating one of the peculiarities and controversies of a civil for-
feiture.
9
Criminal forfeiture is an in personam action in which the
personal property of the defendant on trial can be forfeited.' 0 In a
criminal forfeiture, if the Government can establish that the rele-
vant property is "missing" or unaccounted for, the Government
can obtain a money judgment equal in value to the lost property.11
Procedures for forfeiture depend largely on the category of forfei-
ture undertaken.
B. Customs Forfeiture In General
Seizure and forfeiture procedures under the customs statute
(Title 19) are unique. Forfeitures under Title 19 often commence
as administrative forfeitures and become civil forfeitures when a
claimant files an action in court opposing seizure. Seized proper-
ty, assuming such property is not intrinsically illegal (for example,
a narcotic), bearing an appraised value of less than $10,000, can be
released to a person with "substantial interest" in the work if that
person pays the appraised value of the merchandise and does so
within 20 days after notice of seizure.12 If no claim is made within
20 days, CBP can gain title to that merchandise through adminis-
8 Id. at 132. Prior to passage of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act
(CAFRA) in 2000, the Government, for any civil forfeiture, needed to
prove only by probable cause that a nexus existed between the property
and the crime at issue. See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000) (raising the burden of proof in
civil forfeiture actions and creating an innocent-owner defense in such
proceedings).
9 Cassella, supra note 6, at 133.
'
0 Id. at 133-34.
" Id. at 139.
12 19 U.S.C. §§ 1606, 1608, 1614 (2012).
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trative forfeiture and may auction the property, or dispose of it as
provided by law.' 3 If seized property is appraised at $10,000 or
more, CBP must file a report with the United States Attorney's Of-
fice in the district in which the property was seized; a claim is then
filed against the property in federal court and a civil forfeiture ac-
tion commences. 14 Prior to seizing the property, however, the
Government must demonstrate probable cause that the property is
subject to seizure and forfeiture.' 5 Provided that the Government
has met this burden, the burden shifts to the claimant to prove that
the property was not subject to forfeiture under the heightened
preponderance-of-evidence standard. 16
C. CAFRA Changes Everything
In 2000, Congress passed the Civil Asset Forfeiture Re-
form Act (CAFRA), which raised the burden of proof for the Gov-
ernment to seize and forfeit property from probable cause to the
heightened preponderance-of-evidence standard.17 The Govern-
ment is now required to give notice of forfeiture to occur within 60
days.' 8 Claimants of seized property are also entitled to an inno-
cent-owner defense under CAFRA. 19 However, while CAFRA
explicitly states that it applies to all civil forfeiture actions, 20 the
"customs carve-out" in this statute excludes "the Tariff Act of
1930 and any other provision of law codified in Title 19" from its
21scope. Courts have explicitly held that Title 19 contains no in-
nocent-owner defense (i.e. the right of a claimant to allege that he
or she actually possesses good title) for civil forfeiture actions aris-
ing under that statute.22
1Id. § 1609(a).
14Id. §§ 1604, 1610.
15 Id. § 1615; United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 2011).
16 19 U.S.C. § 1615, preempted in part by United States v. Mondragon,
313 F.3d 862 (4th Cir. 2002).
17 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) (2012).
18 Id. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i).
'9 Id. § 983(d).
20 Id. § 983(i)(1).
21 Id. § 983(i)(2)(A).
22 United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 95.
339
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D. Forfeiture Under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a
Section 1595a of the customs statute allows CBP to seize
property imported illegally. In relevant part, Section 1595a(c)
provides: "Merchandise which is introduced or attempted to be in-
troduced into the United States contrary to law shall be treated as
follows: (1) the merchandise shall be seized and forfeited if it...
(A) is stolen, smuggled, or clandestinely imported or introduced..
. .,23 Generally, the law under which the "contrary to law" portion
of Section 1595a(c) may be satisfied in cultural 2property forfei-
tures is the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA).2 The "contrary
to law" portion may also be satisfied by a provision prohibiting
failure to properly complete customs documents. 25 The NSPA re-
quires the property at issue to be valued at a minimum of $5,000
and provides for an innocent-owner defense to the extent that the
Government must show that the owner "knowingly" violated the
law. 2
6
In theory, "every vessel, vehicle, animal, aircraft, or other
thing used in, to aid in, or to facilitate . . ." the importation of an
item introduced into the United States contrary to law is subject to
forfeiture 27 and any person "who directs, assists financially or oth-
erwise, or is in any way concerned in any .. ." activities contrary
to law is liable to a penalty equal to the appraised value of the
seized item.28
E. Forfeiture Under 18 U.S. C. § 545
Another relevant statute used by the Government is Section
545 of the criminal statute. That statute states:
Whoever knowingly and willfully, with intent to
defraud the United States, smuggles, or clandestine-
ly introduces or attempts to introduce into the Unit-
23 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c) (2012).
24 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314, 2315 (2012).
25 Id. § 542.
26 Id. §§ 2314, 2315.
27 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(a) (2012).
28 Id. § 1595a(b).
340
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ed States any merchandise which should have been
invoiced, or makes out or passes, or attempts to
pass through the customhouse any false, forged, or
fraudulent invoice, or other document or paper [sh-
all be prosecuted] ....
Section 545 is another powerful means of seizing and for-
feiting cultural property, often used specifically in relation to ma-
terial falsities on a customs entry form.
F. Summary of Forfeiture Procedures
The Government possesses a range of statutory provisions
to seize goods illegally introduced into the United States. These
provisions can be administrative, civil, or criminal in nature and
can occur under several different statutes, including the criminal
statute and the customs statute. Section 1595a of the customs stat-
ute, in particular, represents one of the Government's most power-
ful civil forfeiture mechanisms because it is not subject to the
heightened requirements imposed on the Government by the
amendments in CAFRA.
1II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF 19 U.S.C. § 1595A
Section 1595a of the customs statute has had an illustrious
history and has been tied to several key developments in the Unit-
ed States government's efforts to curtail illegal entry of materials
into the country. That history has spanned much of the twentieth
century and has undergone key developments in recent decades.
The legislative history of this forfeiture device reveals the evolu-
tion of this provision over the past century.
The modem customs forfeiture provision, 19 U.S.C. §
1595a, began with passage of Public Law 71-361, better known as
the Tariff Act of 1930, or the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. That law
began as House Resolution 2667 before the 71st U.S. Congress
29 18 U.S.C. § 545.
7
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and was passed on June 17, 1930.30 While economists have criti-
cized the high duty rates imposed by this law as contributing to re-
duced exportation and a worsening of the Great Depression, the
law also contains several novel provisions relating to importation
of materials into the country. The overall purpose of this bill was,
among other things, to "provide revenue, to regulate commerce
with foreign countries, to encourage the industries of the United
States, [and] to protect American labor."
3
'
Section 305 of this Act, entitled "Immoral Articles - Im-
portation Prohibited," allowed customs authorities to seize, inter
alia, pornography, obscene books and pictures, lottery tickets,
medicine to induce abortions, and seditious literature, which re-
flects an intent to use customs authorities as a barrier for materials
that are likely to have a pernicious impact on the American public
in general.32 The Tariff Act of 1930 also expresses concern for
domestic commerce, seen through the presence of provisions bar-
ring, for example, importation of merchandise bearing counterfeit
American trademarks or otherwise infringing on intellectual prop-
erty rights in the United States. 33 Section 615 of this Act estab-
lishes that the burden of proof in all relevant forfeiture matters
34
shall be probable cause.
The embryonic form of the modem Section 1595a is Sec-
tion 593 of the Tariff Act of 1930, entitled "Smuggling and Clan-
destine Importation." 35 That section provided in full that:
(a) Fraud on Revenue - If any person knowingly
and willfully with intent to defraud the revenue of
the United States, smuggles, or clandestinely intro-
duces into the United States any merchandise which
should have been invoiced, or makes out or passes,
or attempts to pass, through the customs house any
false, forged, or fraudulent invoice, or other docu-
30 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (Tariff Act of 1930), Pub. L. No. 71-361, 40
Stat. 590 (1930).3" Id. ch. 497, tit. IV, pmbl.
32 Tariff Act of 1930 § 305.
33 See id § 526.
34 1d. § 615.
3 1 Id. § 593.
342
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ment or paper, every such person, his, her, or their
aiders and abettors, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be
fined in any sum not exceeding $5,000, or impris-
oned for any term of time not exceeding two years,
or both, at the discretion of the court.
(b) Importation Contrary to Law - If any person
fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings into the
United States, or assists in so doing, any merchan-
dise contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys,
sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation,
concealment, or sale of such merchandise after im-
portation, knowing the same to have been imported
or brought into the United States contrary to law,
such merchandise shall be forfeited and the offend-
er shall be fined in any sum not exceeding $5,000
nor less than $50, or be imprisoned for any time not
exceeding two years, or both.
(c) Presumptions - Whenever, on trial for a viola-
tion of this section, the defendant is shown to have
or to have had possession of such goods, such pos-
session shall be deemed evidence sufficient to au-
thorize conviction, unless the defendant shall ex-
plain the possession to the satisfaction of the jury.36
Section 593(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides the an-
cient incarnation of modem Section 1595a.37 Early forfeitures un-
der this provision, and its forfeiture precursor 19 U.S.C. § 483,
36 id.
37 Note that Section 593(a) provides the initial basis for 18 U.S.C. § 545.
Although the modem Section 545 was not initiated in legislation until
1948 with passage of chapter 645, 62 Stat. 716, Section 593(a) and (b)
were amended contemporaneously in 1954 with passage of chapter 1213,
Title V, § 507, 68 Stat. 1141 and chapter 1213, Title V, § 502, 68 Stat.
1140, respectively.
9
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generally involved seizure and disposition of alcohol and vehicles
used to transport alcohol into the United States during prohibi-
tion."
Section 593(b) was amended in 1954 and the section num-
ber was changed to 596.39 The relevant provision then read:
(a) Except as [specified elsewhere], every vessel,
vehicle, animal aircraft, or other thing used in, to
aid in, or to facilitate, by obtaining information or
in any otherway, the importation, bringing in, un-
lading, landing, removal, concealing, harboring, or
subsequent transportation of any article which is be-
ing or has been introduced, or attempted to be in-
troduced, into the United States contrary to law ...
shall be seized and forfeited together with its tackle,
apparel, furniture, harness, or equipment.
40
This provision replaces the word "merchandise" with "arti-
cle" and removes the "fraudulently or knowingly" language in the
1930 provision.
Section 596 was subsequently amended in 1986 as part of
the Government's War on Drugs.41 The amendments struck "shall
be seized" in the 1954 Act and changed that to a permissive "may
be seized" and added a new section stating that, "(c) Any mer-
chandise that is introduced or attempted to be introduced into the
38 See, e.g., United States v. One Reo Coupe Automobile, 46 F.2d 816
(D.C. Mass. 1931) (involving seizure and forfeiture of car used to smug-
gle whiskey into the country from Canada); United States v. Hunter, 80
F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1936) (involving seizure and forfeiture of an airplane
used to smuggle forty cases of liquor from the British Virgin Island to
Florida); 19 U.S.C. § 483 was repealed by the Customs Simplification
Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 768, 68 Stat. 1140 (1954), and consolidated
with Section 596 to become the modem Section 1595a.
39 Customs Simplification Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 768, 68 Stat. 1140
(1954).
40 Id. § 596.
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United States contrary to law . . . may be seized or forfeited.A
2
Section 1595a also took its current statute number under these
amendments. The fact that modem Section 1595a was amended as
part of a seminal statute in the War on Drugs suggests that the
statute was beginning to be viewed as a tool of broader and more
coordinated criminal enforcement, rather than simply enforcement
of customs measures. Section 1595a took its current structure dur-
ing amendments to the Customs Statute during the passage of the
North American Free Trade Agreement in 199343 and was then
amended again in 199644 and 20064' as part of efforts to curb in-
ternational terrorism and protect national security.
IV. CASE STUDIES INVOLVING SECTION 1595A
The development of Section 1595a of the customs statute
over the last eight decades reveals an evolution of this provision
from a measure to protect industry and wellbeing to a measure
used as part of law enforcement globally. This evolved standard is
illustrated in some of the following case law. This section will il-
lustrate the Government's application of Section 1595a in cases
involving both non-cultural property and cultural property forfei-
tures and will then compare Section 1595a's usage in both instanc-
es.
A. Non-Cultural Property Forfeiture Cases
Before examining application of Section 1595a in cultural
property forfeitures, it will be beneficial to first examine forfei-
tures under this provision as applied in non-cultural property cases.
421Id. § 3123.
43 North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
44 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (providing for seizure and forfeiture of
plastic explosives).
41 USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006) (adding in current sub-section
(d) of Section 1595a allowing for similar seizure and forfeiture for ex-
portation contrary to law).
11
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As this section will demonstrate, non-cultural property cases seem
to be more concerned with broader societal concerns, such as pre-
venting drug importation and closely regulating importation of
weapons and other dangerous substances, while cultural property
forfeitures seem focused on making the rightful owner of the prop-
erty whole again. Non-cultural property forfeitures under Section
1595a are also, oddly, much less common than cultural property
forfeitures in the case law.
1. The Lobster Vessel Case
Section 1595a has occasionally been used to forfeit vessels
used to import illicit drugs.47 An illustrative case is United States
v. One Defender Lobster Vessel Named Betty H.48 Customs agents
received a tip that a docked vessel in Florida was being used to
smuggle marijuana into the country by means of a special fitted
compartment installed in the vessel.49 Agents searched this com-
partment and found 12-15 grams of marijuana, along with a large
amount of spoiled fish that was believed to be subterfuge in the
event that the Coast Guard ever searched the vessel. 50 The claim-
ant and owner of the vessel in that case asserted that he was inno-
cent given that he had merely leased the vessel out to other par-
ties.5
The Southern District of Florida in the Lobster Vessel case
found that the marijuana residue found in the secret compartment
was sufficient to initiate forfeiture proceedings under Section
46 See, e.g., United States v. DeGregory, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (S.D. Fla.
2006) (finding that forfeiture under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a was proper where
the claimant had been found to have been using a plane to import Iridium
192, a dangerous substance, into the country in violation of 49 U.S.C. §
46312, which regulates transportation of hazardous materials).
47 See, e.g., Doherty v. United States, 500 F.2d 540 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (in-
volving seizure of a pickup truck used to smuggle marijuana from Mexi-
co).
4' 606 F. Supp. 32 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
49 Id. at 34.




DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol25/iss2/4
2015] THE RECOVERY OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 347
1595a and 21 U.S.C. § 881, a drug forfeiture statute.5 2 The pres-
ence of a secret compartment on this vessel was sufficient to con-
stitute concealment for the purposes of smuggling under Section
1595a.53 The claimant was also not entitled to reprieve as an inno-
cent owner because he had failed to pursue due diligence in ascer-
taining the identity of the individual or individuals who leased the
vessel, in determining where the vessel went when it was leased,
and in properly inspecting the vessel upon return.54 The vessel
was forfeited under both the customs statute and the drug forfei-
ture statute.
2. The DeGregory Case
The Lobster Vessel case presents a generic example of a
court utilizing Section 1595a as a means to curtail ongoing crimi-
nal activity and to prevent great harm to society that might result
from importation of materials that pose a physical danger to the
public. A much more recent but still similar example is the case
United States v. DeGregory, which is also from the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida.55 In DeGregory, the Government sought forfeiture
of an airplane used to import Iridium 192 into Florida in violation
of 49 U.S.C. § 46312, which regulates transportation of hazardous
materials.56 The court there found that sufficient grounds existed
for forfeiture under Section 1595a for violating laws relating to
transport of hazardous materials.57 The application of Section
1595a in the DeGregory case and in the Lobster Vessel case re-
52 Id. at 36.
53 Id.
54 One Defender Lobster Vessel Named Betty II, 606 F. Supp. at 36. It is
curious that the court examined the possibility of an innocent-owner de-
fense under Section 1595a since it had been held in the 1930s that the
customs statute did not provide for such a defense. See General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286 U.S. 49, 57 (1932).
55 480 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
16 Id. at 1303-04.
57 Id. at 1306. The court's decision in this case does not specify which
subsection of Section 1595a was violated, although presumably it was
either the "smuggled" or the "clandestinely imported or introduced" por-
tion of Section 1595a(c)(1)(A).
13
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veals an intent to use customs laws to protect the basic health and
safety of the public. The customs statute may be a useful means of
fulfilling these kinds of health and safety concerns if some nexus
with international travel can be established.
3. The Douglas Aircraft Case
Section 1595a has also been used to impose forfeiture of
weapons and related components that were imported contrary to
law. In the case of United States v. One Douglas AD-4N Skyraider
Aircraft, the Government sought forfeiture of both an aircraft and
related armaments that were imported contemporaneously and then
seized.58 A company in Alabama arranged to have an aircraft and
cannons for that aircraft imported separately from France.59 In-
voices for the aircraft indicated that it was not to be used for any
type of military purpose and the invoice for the cannons labeled
the shipment merchandise as "Aircraft Parts: Other." 60 The Gov-
ernment sought forfeiture of both the aircraft and the cannons on
two grounds: (1) that the aircraft and the cannons did not possess
the required permits necessary under 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (the United
States Munitions List) in violation of 19 U.S.C. §1595a(c)(2)(B), 6'
which criminalizes importing merchandise without required doc-
umentation or permits; and (2) that the aircraft and cannons were
"clandestinely imported" as a result of material misrepresentations
on importation documents in violation of 19 U.S.C. §
1595a(c)(1)(A) with the underlying law encompassing 18 U.S.C.
§§ 542 and 545.62
The court in that case ultimately found that forfeiture could
be fully obtained under Section 1595a(c)(2)(B) for failing to obtain
58 839 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (N.D. Ala. 2011).
59 Id. at 1245-46.60 Id. at 1245.
61 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(2)(B) provides that, "Merchandise which is in-
troduced or attempted to be contrary to law ... may be seized and forfeit-
ed if ... its importation or entry requires a license, permit or other au-
thorization of an agency of the United States Government and the
merchandise is not accompanied by such license, permit, or authoriza-
tion."
62 Douglas Aircraft, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 1250-52.
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required permits and did not reach the issue of the applicability of
Section 1595a(c)(1)(A) for clandestine importation contrary to
law.63  The Government's motion for summary judgment was
thereafter granted.64
The material misstatements in the Douglas Aircraft case
above, namely failing to properly classify the aircraft as a military
aircraft and failing to label the cannon components properly, are
substantially similar to those made in the case United States v. One
Triangular Fresco Fragment (hereinafter "Paestum Fragment")
that will be discussed in the section on cultural property cases be-
low.6 5 As will be shown below, the misstatements made in that
cultural property forfeiture related to classification of the frescos
as "personal" items rather than as items for sale.66 This perhaps
suggests that misclassification in itself can constitute a form of
smuggling for purposes of Section 1595a(c)(1)(A), although the
Douglas Aircraft case never reached this analysis and the property
in the Paestum Fragment case was eventually abandoned and will
not be adjudicated.
4. The 3,527 Firearms Case
A similar case to that of Douglas Aircraft is United States
v. Three Thousand, Five Hundred, and Twenty-Seven (3,527)
Firearms, one also involving forfeiture of weapons under Section
1595a.67 The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF)
searched the property of a firearms licensee and discovered ma-
chinegun barrels from Hungary illegally attached to a number of
weapons on the premises; the Government subsequently seized
these weapons and moved for forfeiture. 68
The Government brought forfeiture proceedings under two
sub-sections of Section 1595a: (1) Section 1595a(c)(2)(B) on the
grounds that the licensee had failed to state specifications on re-
63 Id. at 1254.
64id.
65 Complaint at 7, United States v. One Triangular Fresco Fragment, No.
13 Civ. 6286 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2013).
66 id.
67 2012 WL 2328010 (E.D. Tenn. June 19, 2012).
68 Id. at * 1.
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quired ATF forms relating to gun capabilities, origin of compo-
nents, etc., in violation of 22 U.S.C. § 2778(C); 69 and (2) Section
1595a(c)(1)(A) on the grounds that the components had been clan-
destinely imported contrary to law in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
925(d)(3), which prohibits importation of gun components that
would render the assembled gun illegal. 70 The licensee-claimant
moved to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint failed to allege
a specific "contrary to law" provision violated under either one of
these sub-sections and had otherwise failed to allege that the com-
ponents were imported clandestinely or without proper licenses.71
The court in 3,527 Firearms held for the Government on
both counts of the complaint finding that evidence was sufficient
to find that the components were "clandestinely imported or intro-
duced" contrary to law under Section 1595a(c)(1)(A), coupled
with 18 U.S.C. § 925(d)(3) criminalizing introduction of illegal
gun components, and were not accompanied by required licenses
or permits as required under Section 1595a(c)(2)(B) coupled with
7222 U.S.C. § 2778(c). Unfortunately, the court did not go into a
detailed explanation as to how it arrived at these legal conclusions.
5. Summary of Non-Cultural Property Forfeiture Cases
The Government's treatment of the preceding non-cultural
property forfeiture cases illustrates an executive branch that is
concerned with protecting the health and welfare of its people
against the importation of harmful goods. The cultural property
case studies in the following section will reveal a very different
approach to Section 1595a by the Government.
B. Cultural Property Forfeiture Cases
The number of forfeitures involving cultural property has
increased dramatically over the past fifteen years. Many of these
cultural property forfeitures, as illustrated by the three cases ana-
69 22 U.S.C. § 2778 states the registration and license requirements need-
ed to import weapons into the United States.
70 3,527 Firearms, 2012 WL 2328010, at *7-*9.
71 Id. at *4, *8-*9.
72 Id. at *9.
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lyzed in this section, were undertaken under Section 1595a in par-
ticular. These cases illustrate a variety of ways in which treatment
of cultural property under forfeiture laws is distinct from treatment
of other types of property.
1. The Gold Phiale Case
The Gold Phiale case is one of the most iconic cases in cul-
tural property law. In 1999, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
decided the case United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold (here-
inafter "Gold Phiale").73 This case stands for the proposition that
false statements on a customs importation form alone constitute
grounds for forfeiture of cultural property. The cultural property at
issue in that case was a fourth-century B.C.E. gold platter from
Sicily. In 1991, the platter was sold by its Sicilian possessor to a
Swiss art merchant, who, in turn, brought it to the attention of New
York art dealer Robert Haber.74 Haber purchased the platter for
$1.2 million on belief that a client, Michael Steinhardt, would be
interested in purchasing the platter. 75 Haber traveled to Switzer-
land and took possession of the platter on or around December 12,
1991 in Lugano, near the Italian border.76
Haber listed the country of origin for the platter as Switzer-
land and valued the work at $225,000. 77 The platter then entered
the United States at the Port of New York and was turned over to
Michael Steinhardt, who soon consigned the platter to the Metro-.
politan Museum of Art to verify the work's authenticity. 78 The
Italian government requested return of the piece in February 1995
and agents seized the platter on November 9, 1995. 79 The United
States Attorney's Office filed civil forfeiture proceedings under
two separate statutes: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 545 with 18 U.S.C. § 542
satisfying the "contrary to law" provision of that statute for false
statements on importation forms, and (2) 19 U.S.C. § 1595a with
71 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999).
74 991 F. Supp. 222, 224-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
75 Id. at 225.
76 Id. at 226.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 226-27.
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the NSPA (18 U.S.C. § 2314) satisfying the "contrary to law" pro-
vision of that statute for introduction of stolen goods.80 Michael
Steinhardt was the relevant claimant contesting forfeiture.
The district court found the Government had met its burden
of showing probable cause under both counts.81 The district court
was satisfied that Italy's cultural patrimony laws could satisfy
ownership as a predicate to establish that the platter was "stolen"
under the NSPA. 82 The district court also adopted the Govern-
ment's interpretation of Section 542's materiality requirement as
"natural tendency to mislead," as opposed to the higher "but-for"
standard advocated for by Michael Steinhardt.83 The Government
met its burden under this standard by pointing out that the country
of origin listed (Switzerland) would not have raised any red flags
with Customs agents, but the actual country of origin (Italy) would
have.84 This material misrepresentation was sufficient to satisfy
importation contrary to law under Section 545 with Section 542 as
the underlying law.
The district court also found that the Government had
shown probable cause to forfeit the platter under Section 1595a
and the NSPA. 5 Various facts established that Haber knew the
platter was stolen when he took possession of it and introduced it
into the United States. Haber took possession of the platter near
the Italian border and drove across Switzerland to Zurich to fly
back to New York, when it would have been geographically more
practical to fly back from Milan.86 'Haber had also informed
Steinhardt that the platter's twin was located at the Met and its
original owner was a Sicilian coin dealer.
87
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
"natural tendency" interpretation Of Section 542 and found that
80 United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 991 F. Supp. 222, 226-27.
"' Id. at 230, 232. This case was decided pre-CAFRA and probable
cause was the government's burden of proof under Section 545 as well
as Section 1595a.82 Id. at 232.
831 Id. at 230.
84 id.
85 Id. at 232.
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this provision alone was sufficient for forfeiture under Section
545. 88  The Government had sufficiently established probable
cause under its Section 545 claim; therefore, it was not necessary
to reach the issue of Section 1595a on appeal.
Given that CAFRA in 2000 raised the Government's bur-
den of proof from probable cause to preponderance of evidence, it
is debatable whether the Government would have been able to sus-
tain its forfeiture case under Section 545 with the evidence pre-
sented. However, the district court's finding that Section 1595a
was satisfied under probable cause is probably nonetheless suffi-
cient given that Section 1595a was untouched by CAFRA. Gold
Phiale represents one of the seminal cases in which Section 1595a
was applied in a cultural property forfeiture proceeding. This case
has also influenced subsequent cases involving civil forfeiture of
cultural property, including the following case involving a sand-
stone sculpture from Cambodia.
2. The Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture Case
More recently, the Southern District of New York had
cause to examine Section 1595a's application in a forfeiture action
against a Cambodian sculpture. This case is relevant, in part, be-
cause it demonstrates the Government's treatment of cultural
property forfeitures post-CAFRA. Sotheby's auction house be-
came embroiled in this forfeiture action as claimant in the case of
United States v. A l0th-Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture
(hereinafter, "Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture"). That case in-
volved a mounted warrior sculpture believed to have originated in
Cambodia and to have been looted from the Koh Ker site in that
country in 1972.89 The Complaint in that case alleged that the
Sculpture had been sold to a collector shortly after 1972 and who
88 United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 134 (2d
Cir. 1999). The appeals court rendered no opinion on whether Italy's
cultural patrimony laws would be applicable under Section 545. Section
545 could presumably have been invoked to establish that the platter's
provenance had been obscured to facilitate smuggling.
89 Complaint at 2-8, United States v. A 10th-Century Cambodian Sand-
stone Sculpture, No. 12 Civ. 2600, 2013 WL 1290515 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9,
2012).
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had reason to believe that the work had been looted from Koh
Ker.90 A Belgian businessman purchased the Sculpture from this
collector and that businessman's wife tried to sell the work
through Sotheby's. 91
The Government sought forfeiture of that work on three
bases: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) as proceeds of illegal activity
under the NSPA (18 U.S.C. § 2314),92 (2) Section 545 and the
NSPA (18 U.S.C. § 2314) as objects illicitly transported in interna-
tional commerce with Sotheby's knowledge that the works were
stolen, and (3) Section 1595a and the NSPA as objects illicitly
transported in interstate commerce with Sotheby's knowledge that
the works were stolen.
93
In denying Sotheby's motion to dismiss, the district court
stated that the government under such theories must plead (1) that
the statue was stolen, (2) that the statue remained stolen at the time
of import into the United States, and (3) that Sotheby's knew that
the statue was stolen. 94 The district court denied Sotheby's motion
to dismiss because (1) the Government had shown sufficient evi-
dence that the Sculpture qualified as stolen to survive a motion to
dismiss; (2) the Government met its burden under a motion to dis-
miss of showing that the Sculpture was stolen at the time of import
and that Sotheby's had been unable to rebut that presumption; and
(3) the Government sufficiently pled facts to establish that Sothe-
by's knew that the Sculpture was Khmer, was missing its ankles
(which suggested illicit looting), and appeared on the market at the
time of known looting within the art community.
95
The district court's opinion emphasized the fact that Sothe-
by's was an expert on Southeast Asian art and must have known
that the Sculpture at issue had been looted and then illegally intro-
duced.96 The Government also alleged that Sotheby's also knew
that the collector had sold the work in 1975 and was aware of the
90 Id. at 8. The looting at Koh Ker was apparently widely known within
the international art community.
9' Id. at 9.
92 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (2012).
93 Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture, 2013 WL 1290515, at *6.
94 Id.
95Id. at 8-10.96 Id. at 10.
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Sculpture's inaccurate provenance. 97 These facts accepted as true
were sufficient to defeat Sotheby's motion to dismiss.98 The Gov-
ernment's allegations in the Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture case
present an example of the Government fulfilling its burden of
proof to defeat a motion to dismiss in a cultural property case from
New York.
3. The Paestum Fragment Case
Most recently, the United States Attorney's Office for the
Eastern District of New York filed forfeiture proceedings in rela-
tion to a fresco fragment allegedly from the archaeological site of
Paestum in Italy that was recovered upon entry into the United
States. This case also represents another post-CAFRA example of
the Government's use of forfeiture provisions in a cultural proper-
ty case. In United States v. One Triangular Fresco Fragment
(hereinafter, "Paestum Fragment"), the Government alleged that
the fragment was subject to forfeiture under Section
1595a(c)(1)(A) with the "contrary to law" provision satisfied by
both Section 542 and the NSPA.99 The fragment was shipped
from Switzerland to New York by a dealer named Schwarz on
April 19, 2013 on behalf of a citizen of Lichtenstein to be pur-
chased by Michael Steinhardt. 00 The airway bill filled out by
Schwarz declared the fragment's country of origin as Morocco and
its intended use as "personal" rather than "for sale."''1 1 CBP
agents seized the fragment on April 20, 2013 at Newark Interna-
tional Airport and requested further provenance information from
Schwarz. 10 2 Schwarz supplied an affidavit of provenance, which
stated that the fragment was being shipped to New York to display
to a potential purchaser, that the fragment's country of origin was
Macedonia, and that it had been in Switzerland since 1959. Both
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Complaint at 1-3, No. 13 Civ. 6286 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2013).
1oo Id. at 7. Michael Steinhardt was also the relevant claimant in the
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statements were inconsistent with statements made on the airway
bill.' °3
Investigators subsequently showed photographs of the
fragment to an art expert who identified the fragment as similar to
other works from the Paestum archaeological site in Italy.'0 4 The
Italian Carabinieri/TPC concurred and identified the fragments as
part of a section of the Paestum site that had been excavated in
1969, ten years after the affidavit of provenance reported the work
in private ownership in Switzerland. 10 5 The TPC also noted that
thefts had occurred from the Paestum site and no export permits
had ever been issued for the Paestum site by the Italian govern-
ment.
106
The Government's Complaint alleges that the facts estab-
lished above are sufficient to show that both the country of origin
declaration and the affidavit of provenance were false. 107 The
false declarations of country of origin indicate that the fragment's
importers were aware of Italy's cultural patrimony laws and were
trying to circumvent those laws.' 0 8 The Government also sought
forfeiture under Section 1595a(c)(1)(A) as "stolen" in violation of
Italy's cultural patrimony laws and the NSPA. 0 9
The Government's attempt to couple Section 1595a-
(c)(1)(A) with Section 542 of the criminal statute is interesting as
it implies that the Government may also be seeking recovery under
the "smuggled" or "clandestinely imported or introduced" portions
of Section 1595a(c)(1)(A), although the Government only ever al-
leges that the fragment was "stolen."' 1 0 It seems somewhat redun-
dant to pursue forfeiture for false statements made on import doc-
uments under Section 542 when forfeiture would be guaranteed if
the Government could establish that the work was stolen. The in-
103 id.
104 Complaint at 8, United States v. One Triangular Fresco Fragment,




08 Id. at 5-6.
'09 Id. at 5-6, 10.
110 See Complaint at 6, 10, United States v. One Triangular Fresco Frag-
ment, No. 13 Civ. 6286 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2013).
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clusion of Section 542, in addition to a claim under the NSPA,
seems to be more of a guaranteed safeguard given the ease of es-
tablishing the falsity of a statement on a customs document com-
pared to establishing whether property was stolen from a foreign
country.
4. A Comparison of Cultural Property and Non-Cultural Property
Forfeiture Cases
These cultural property cases, when examined against
some of the non-cultural property cases discussed in the previous
section, indicate some ways in which Section 1595a is treated dif-
ferently between these two categories of property. First, as men-
tioned previously in this section, many of the extant non-cultural
property cases seem to reflect the behavior of a government that is
concerned with protecting the health and safety of its citizens by
curtailing importation of such things as illicit drugs, hazardous
chemicals, and weapons. This seems to suggest that the Govern-
ment is viewing Section 1595a as a means of using the customs
statute to counter harmful importation of dangerous items even af-
ter those items have been in the country for some time. This
seems to be a correct public policy result given the importance of
curtailing abuse of drugs, hazardous materials, and weapons. In
contrast, the public policy concerns underlying Section 1595a cul-
tural property forfeitures seem somewhat less compelling."' Fur-
thermore, seizing cultural property that has been in the country for
some time seems to implicate less-compelling governmental inter-
ests than seizing property that involves a fundamental public
health or safety concern.
Second, in the non-cultural property forfeitures examined
previously, the Government did not readily rely on multiple forfei-
ture statutes in the same complaint, such as 18 U.S.C. § 545 or §
981, but instead used only Section 1595a, albeit sometimes differ-
ent sub-sections of that provision. This result makes sense in light
1 The most commendable purpose for forfeiting cultural property
would be to right an ongoing wrong and to prevent the United States, a
key market for such materials, from gaining a reputation for lax en-
forcement of cultural property misuse.
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of CAFRA because the Government is subject to a lower burden of
persuasion under the forfeiture provisions of Title 19 than under
the forfeiture provisions of Title 18.112 Given this course of action
in non-cultural property forfeitures, it is curious that the Govern-
ment would nonetheless choose to pursue multiple forfeiture stat-
utes under different titles of the United States Code simultaneously
in cultural property cases, as it did, for example, in the Cambodian
Sandstone Sculpture case.'1 3 It may be possible that the Govern-
ment views non-cultural property cases as more standard and pre-
dictable in result, while cultural property cases may retain an ele-
ment of novelty and uniqueness for prosecutors.
The absence of a great many non-cultural property cases in
the case law referencing Section 1595a is also somewhat puzzling.
This may well be because interested parties in non-cultural proper-
ty forfeitures are more likely to simply walk away from seized
property and never file a claim (many parties here are, indeed,
criminals), while interested parties in cultural property forfeitures
may have a greater personal stake in the seized property and are
thus willing to see a claim through to disposition." 4 Assuming
this hypothesis is true, it may be due to key differences in the val-
ue of the property at issue, either monetarily or sentimentally, or
perhaps due to a greater belief among owners of cultural property
materials that they have not violated any laws by introducing these
items into the United States.
Cultural property forfeiture cases under Section 1595a pre-
sent an interesting contrast to the use of that provision in the con-
text of non-cultural property cases. With that background into
112 See 18 U.S.C. § 983(i)(2)(A) (2012) (a/k/a the "Customs Carveout").
113 Complaint, United States v. A 10th-Century Cambodian Sandstone
Sculpture, No. 12 Civ. 2600, 2013 WL 1290515 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9,
2012).
114 Claimants in cultural property cases do walk away from forfeited
property, for example in the Paestum Fragment case. See Paestum
Fragment, No. 13 Civ. 6286 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2013). However,
claimants in more high-profile cases involving cultural property, for ex-
ample Gold Phiale and Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture, generally do
not walk away from the property. See United States v. An Antique Plat-
ter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131; Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture, No. 12 Civ.
2600, 2013 WL 1290515 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013).
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Section 1595a in mind, it will be helpful to now explore areas and
issues that remain either ambiguous or unknown with regard to the
treatment of Section 1595a in cultural property forfeitures.
V. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Having examined the mechanics of civil forfeiture provi-
sions, in particular Section 1595a of Title 19, the history of Section
1595a, and case law applying Section 1595a in both cultural prop-
erty and non-cultural property contexts, this article will now ex-
plore issues involving customs forfeiture provisions that remain
unclear under the law. These issues include: (1) the burden of
proof under Section 1595a, (2) the possibility of a scienter re-
quirement under Section 1595a, (3) whether or not the NSPA pro-
vides for something other than theft, (4) whether the "contrary to
law" language in Section 1595a encompasses foreign law as well
as U.S. law, (5) whether civil forfeiture of cultural property works
should be used only in ongoing criminal investigations, and (6)
whether Section 1595a is being used appropriate by the United
States Attorneys.
A. Burden of Proof Under Section 1595a
As mentioned briefly in Section III of this article, forfeiture
statutes differ in the burdens of proof they require the Government
to meet prior to forfeiture. Section 1595a of the customs statute
requires a mere showing of probable cause on the part of the gov-
ernment in order to forfeit property; the burden then shifts to the
claimant to rebut this probable cause showing by presenting evi-
dence that the property is not subject to forfeiture, or that the
claimant is entitled to some defense, under the heightened prepon-
derance-of-evidence standard." 15 Hearsay evidence may be used to
establish probable cause in civil forfeiture actions. 116
As a result of CAFRA, all forfeiture statutes not included
under Title 19, such as Section 545 of the criminal code, require
115 United States. v. One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar Material, 252 F.
Supp. 2d 1367, 1377 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
n6 Id. at 1378.
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the Government to show proof under the heifhtened preponder-
ance-of-evidence standard prior to forfeiture. 7 The statutes af-
fected by CAFRA now also contain an innocent-owner defense as
a means to further rebut this presumption. 18 If the Government's
theory is that the property was used to "commit or facilitate a
criminal offense, or was involved in the commission of a criminal
offense," the Government may seize that property but must first
show a nexus between the property and the underlying criminal of-
fense. 119 A claimant must first establish standing before being able
to rebut a showing by the government under either standard.
12 0
When Congress was creating the modem Section 1595a as
a forfeiture provision under the customs statute as part of the
amendments made in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, commen-
tators in the customs field observed that the burden of proof under
such a standard would be probable cause, as opposed to the crimi-
nal beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard used under Title 18 provi-
sions. 121 These commentators, working in the government sector
in 1986, also speculated that the Government would be more likely
to pursue forfeiture under Section 1595a "if for no other reason
than to avoid questions about burdens of proof."' 122 This suggests
that, from its modem inception through amendment in the 1980s,
Section 1595a has been understood by practitioners within the
Government as a provision that can be utilized to avoid the height-
ened burden of proof to be established in criminal forfeiture provi-
sions. It also suggests that debate existed as to the applicable bur-
117 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) (2012); United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84,
94. Forfeitures under Title 19 utilizing provisions of the criminal code
as the underlying law, for example Section 1595a coupled with the Na-
tional Stolen Property Act, still appear to require a lower probable cause
burden even though a criminal statute is utilized in such a proceeding.
118 18 U.S.C. §983(d); Davis, 648 F.3d at 94.
119 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3).
120 United States v. One 18th Century Colombian Monstrance, 797 F.2d
1370, 1374-1375 (5th Cir. 1986).
121 See Proceedings of the Third Annual Judicial Conference of the Unit-
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dens of proof under the criminal code prior to the passage of
CAFRA.
The case of United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer pre-
sents a unique situation in which the Government failed to meet its
burden of pleading facts sufficient to support a claim under Sec-
tion 1595a in a cultural property case. 123 The cultural property at
issue in that case was a 3,200-year-old Egyptian mask.124 Evi-
dence indicates that the Mask was excavated from its resting site in
1952, stored until 1959, sent to Cairo and then to a town called
Saqqara and then back to Cairo in 1966, and then kept in storage
until 1973 when it was discovered missing. 125 The Government
sought recovery of the Mask, now in St. Louis, under Section
1595a(c)(1)(A) on the basis that the Mask was stolen from Egypt.
The district court in that case found that Section 1595a requires a
two-prong pleading standard establishing "(1) facts relevant to
whether the Mask was 'stolen, smuggled or clandestinely imported
or introduced' and (2) facts related to some predicate unlawful of-
fense, presumably a law with some 'nexus' to international com-
merce from which the Title 19 customs regulation arises."' 126
The court held in Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer that the Gov-
ernment had failed to meet this pleading standard by not connect-
ing "missing" from Egypt in 1973 to "stolen" and then exported.12 7
The court provided five factors that were missing from the Gov-
ernment's assertion that the Mask was stolen and then illegally ex-
ported: "(1) an assertion that the Mask was actually stolen; (2) fac-
tual circumstances relating to when the Government believes the
Mask was stolen and why; (3) facts relating to the location from
which the Mask was stolen; (4) facts regarding who the Govern-
ment believes stole the Mask; and (5) a statement or identification
123 The current federal pleading standard to withstand a motion to dis-
miss requires a showing of "plausibility" in the underlying claim. See
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556
U.S. 662 (2009).
124 No. 4:11 CV 504 HEA, 2012 WL 1094658, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31,
2012).
125 id.
126 Id. at *2-3.
127 Id. at *3.
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of the law which the Government believes applies under which the
Mask would be considered stolen and/or illegally exported."'
' 28
The Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer case presents an unusual ex-
ample of the Government failing to satisfy its pleading burden in a
forfeiture action involving cultural property. The court in that case
provided useful and specific guidance as to the scope of the plead-
ing standard required under this burden. 129 Thus, the Govern-
ment's burden of proof under Section 1595a, as case law has inter-
preted, remains the lower probable-cause standard.
B. Scienter
A similar unresolved issue under Section 1595a is the pos-
sible existence of a knowledge, or scienter, requirement. Many
forfeiture statutes contain some requirement that the person intro-
ducing the property into the country did so with knowledge of the
wrongness of his or her actions or with intent to commit a crime.
For example, the National Stolen Property Act of Title 18, (which,
as this article has demonstrated, is often used as the underlying law
in the "contrary to law" section of forfeiture statutes such as Sec-
tion 1595a) contains the following relevant language:
Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or
foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or
money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have
been stolen, converted or taken by fraud [is subject to prosecution]
130
Title 18, Section 545 of the Criminal Code provides a similar
knowledge requirement:
128 Id. at *3. The law to be identified under the fifth factor mentioned by
the court would logically have been the NSPA and it seems quite odd
that the Government failed to include such an important provision under
a Section 1595a forfeiture.
129 The court in the Ka-Nefer-Nefer case refused to allow the Govern-
ment leave to amend its complaint. The Government appealed this
point, but the appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal. See
United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, 752 F.3d 737 (8th Cir. 2014).
130 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012) (emphasis added).
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Whoever knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud the
United States, smuggles, or clandestinely introduces or attempts to
smuggle or clandestinely introduce into the United States any mer-
chandise... [or] Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or
brings into the United States, any merchandise contrary to law, or
receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the
transportation, concealment, or sale of such merchandise after im-
portation, knowing the same to have been imported or brought into
the United States contrary to law ... shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.... '31
Criminal intent, or mens rea, is a prerequisite for prosecu-
tion under most criminal statutes and the above provisions are no
exception. The inclusion of language requiring a possessor of sto-
len or otherwise illegally introduced property to have known that
he or she did not lawfully own the property at issue is in keeping
with standards of criminal prosecutions that require defendants to
have actually known that their actions were wrong.
1. Scienter and Section 1595a
Interestingly, it is the subject of some debate whether the
forfeiture clause under the customs statute, Section 1595a, con-
tains any knowledge requirement. Section 1595a provides seizure
and forfeiture of merchandise that is "stolen, smuggled, or clandes-
tinely introduced."' 132 Section 1595a omits Section 545's scienter
language ("knowingly and willfully with intent"), suggesting that
it has not incorporated any such standard. 133 However, the plain
meaning of the terms "smuggled" or "clandestinely imported or in-
troduced" seem to suggest some form of intent to prevent customs
agents from detecting these items. 1
34
131 Id. § 545 (emphasis added).
132 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(1)(A) (2012).133 See United States v. A Painting Called, No. 08 Civ. 1511 (RJS), 2013
WL 1890220, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2013).
134 Id.; see also United States v. Kurfess, 426 F.2d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir.
1970) (stating that the terms "smuggle" and "clandestinely introduce"
entail "any method of introducing goods into the country surreptitiously
by concealment or fraud").
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a. A Painting Called Hannibal
The recent case United States v. A Painting Called Hanni-
bal addressed the issue of scienter under Section 1595a. 135 That
case involved the shipment of two works of art, one a painting and
the other a Mediterranean sculpture.' 36 The relevant purchaser had
paid $1,000,000 for the painting and $600,000 for the sculpture. 1
37
Upon shipment into the Port of New York, the relevant customs
documents stated that both works were worth no more than
$100.138 Upon seizure by customs agents, the combined pieces
were appraised at $8,000,000.139 The Government brought forfei-
ture action for these works under Section 1595a on theory that
both pieces were smuggled by way of false invoices.
140
The District Court for the Southern District of New York
found for the Government and the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals remanded solely to introduce further evidence as to whether
or not the works were smuggled. 14 1 On remand in that case, the
Southern District of New York sought to determine whether Sec-
tion 1595a contained a scienter requirement. 142 The court in that
case found that the issue was ambiguous and ultimately unim-
portant as the Government would prevail in its forfeiture action re-
gardless of whether or not scienter was required. 143 Given that the
invoices, on which customs agents were to determine whether or
not to introduce the works into the country, did not contain a "de-
tailed description of the merchandise" nor an accurate purchase
price paid for either item, the Government could sufficiently estab-
135 No. 08 Civ. 1511 (RJS), 2013 WL 1890220 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25,
2013).




140 United States v. A Painting Called Hannibal, No. 08 Civ. 1511 (RJS),
2013 WL 1890220, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2013).
141 Id. at *2.
142 Id. at *3.
143 See id. at *4; c.f United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 93-95 (holding
that Section 1595a clearly did not contain a scienter requirement nor did
it provide for any type of innocent-owner defense).
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lish that the property had been smuggled within the meaning of
Section 1595a. 14 4 The act of materially misrepresenting key de-
tails on a customs invoice by itself seems to be satisfactory to con-
stitute smuggling under Section 1595a. 145
b. The Portrait of Wally
In the Portrait of Wally litigation, the Government sought
seizure of a 20th-century painting by artist Egon Schiele that was
in the United States on loan from a Viennese museum owned and
operated by Dr. Rudolph Leopold.146 The painting at issue had be-
longed to a Jewish woman from Vienna named Lea Bondi who
was forced to sell the painting to Friedrich Welz, a Nazi Party offi-
cial, during the Holocaust. 147 Following the Second World War,
Bondi contacted Dr. Leopold to assist her in recovering the Wally
painting. 148 Bondi informed Leopold that she was the owner of
Wally. 149 Leopold, in turn, purchased Wally and kept it for him-
self 150 While Wally was on loan in New York, the Government
brought a forfeiture action under Sections 545 and 1595a on the
theory that Wally had been stolen or converted under the NSPA. 151
The district court in that case, in denying Dr. Leopold's
motion to dismiss the case, found that the Government had suffi-
ciently pled facts to establish that Dr. Leopold had the requisite
mens rea to support a finding that he knew Wally was stolen or
converted when he took possession of it.' 52 The fact that Lea
144 A Painting Called Hannibal, No. 08 Civ. 1511 (RJS), 2013 WL
1890220, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2013).
145 Under this reasoning, the Government in the Gold Phiale case could
also have brought a claim under the "smuggled" portion of Section
1595a(c)(1)(A) in addition to its "theft" claim.
'46 No. 99 Civ. 9940 (MBM), 2002 WL 553532, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. April
12, 2002).
147 Id.
148 Id. at *3.
149 Id.
150 United States v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940 (MBM), 2002
WL 553532, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. April 12, 2002).
151 Id. at *4.
2 Id. at *25-26.
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Bondi had informed Dr. Leopold on several occasions that she
owned Wally, coupled with Dr. Leopold's efforts to disguise Wal-
ly's provenance to evade periods of disputed title, constituted suf-
ficient allegation of mens rea to defeat a motion to dismiss.1 53 In
later proceedings in this case, that district court precluded the
Government's summary judgment motion for forfeiture finding
that evidence was insufficient that Dr. Leopold actually knew the
work was stolen or converted.1 54 A trial was ordered to determine
this issue of fact, but no ruling was ever issued due to a settlement
in the case.
The Portrait of Wally litigation, which spanned several
court decisions and many years, serves as useful analysis as to the
applicability of scienter under Section 1595a. It is fair to con-
clude, as a result of this litigation, that the Southern District of
New York imputes some scienter requirement into this statute.
However, this author is not aware of any case law suggesting that
any other district court imputes such a requirement as well.
2. Scienter and the Innocent-Owner Defense
Closely related to the subject of scienter is the possible ex-
istence of an innocent-owner defense under Section 1595a. This
issue was examined by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the
United States v. Davis case.' 55 The claimant's company in that
case purchased Camille Pissarro's monotype, "Le March," for the
work's market value in 1985, unaware that the work had been sto-
len from a French museum in 1981.156 The claimant, Davis, took
personal possession of the work in 1992 and remained in posses-
sion for more than 10 years until she consigned the work to Sothe-
by's for sale; the Government seized the monotype at the request
of French authorities and initiated forfeiture proceedings in
2006.157 The Government alleged forfeiture under three theories,
the most relevant one being a claim under Section 1595a that the
153 Id.
154 United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 269-74
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
115 648 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2011).
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work was stolen in violation of the NSPA.158 Davis asserted that
she was entitled to an innocent-owner defense under Section
1595a. 5 9
The Second Circuit held that Section 1595a did not contain
an innocent-owner defense.' 60 The court first found that because
the action here was a civil in rem forfeiture, proceedings were sub-
ject to lesser procedural and substantive deference than a true
criminal prosecution.161 The court specifically found that Section
1595a's explicit language ("shall be seized and forfeited") was un-
ambiguous and indicates intent to forfeit illicit materials as a "mat-
ter of course."' 162 The court also cited to early customs laws' ex-
clusion of an innocent-owner defense 163 and the general view at
the time of its adoption that penalties under the Tariff Act of 1930,
of which Section 1595a is part, could be asserted even against in-
nocent parties.' 64 This result may be harsh, but it is necessary, the
court found, to ensure the effectiveness of customs regulation. 65
Furthermore, the CAFRA "carve-out" of Title 19 is explicit in its
refusal to impute an innocent-owner defense onto the customs
statute and no provision examined by the court indicates a contrary
intent. 166 The Davis decision clearly states that an innocent owner
of cultural property cannot use his or her lack of knowledge as a
defense under Section 1595a.
3. Summary of Scienter
Scienter is an important part of a quasi-criminal civil for-
feiture proceeding and may arguably be imputed onto the customs
158 id.
159 Id. at 87-88.
160id.
161 United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 92.
162 Id. at 93.
163 Id. (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 330 (1998)).
164 Id. (citing Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286 U.S.
49, 57 (1932)).
165 Id.
166 Id. at 94-95.
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statute.' Criminal intent is a required element in a criminal pros-
ecution. Customs and border protection measures, in contrast,
would not generally require intent as a prerequisite to seize and
forfeit an item because the overall concern of such measures is to
ensure the integrity of the United States border, rather than to im-
pose criminal sanctions for violation of a law. However, it seems
that offenses such as smuggling or clandestine importation, as used
in provisions such as Section 1595a of the customs statute, contain
an element of either knowledge or intent to commit these types of
wrongs. The case law remains unsettled on this point.
In addition to scienter, another unresolved issue involving
civil forfeiture of cultural property is whether such actions could
be pursued under the National Stolen Property Act for crimes such
as conversion or a taking by fraud, in addition to theft.
C. Does the National Stolen Property Act Encompass Something
Besides Theft?
One interesting facet of the Portrait of Wally litigation, de-
scribed in the previous section, is the applicability of conversion as
a means of recovering cultural property under civil forfeiture stat-
utes. The National Stolen Property Act criminalizes transporting
property with knowledge that that property is "stolen, converted,
or taken by fraud."' 168 "Conversion" within the meaning of the
NSPA is defined as "[u]nauthorized and wrongful exercise of do-
minion and control over another's personal property, to the exclu-
sion of or inconsistent with the rights of the owner." 169 Conver-
sion may encompass both unlawful possession from inception and
unauthorized exercise of dominion even after possession of the
property is lawfully obtained. Conversion and theft can often arise
in tandem as well.
167 Barclay Thomas Johnson, Note, Restoring Civility - The Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Baby Steps Towards a More Civilized
Civil Forfeiture System, 35 IND. L. REV. 1045, 1076 (2002).
168 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012); see also United States v. Portrait of Wally,
663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 250.
161 Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940 (MBM), 2002 WL 553532, at *23
(S.D.N.Y. April 12, 2002) (quoting United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d
234, 242 (5th Cir. 1982)).
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Forfeiture of cultural property under a statute using the
NSPA as its enabling law has traditionally relied upon the "theft"
prong of the NSPA as its basis.170 Courts have held that "stealing"
for purposes of "stolen" or "theft" under statutory law "is com-
monly used to denote any dishonest transaction whereby one per-
son obtains that which rightfully belongs to another and deprives
the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership. 17 1 This is most
likely due to substantial evidence of theft in cases involving cul-
tural property illegally imported into the United States. Facts sup-
porting a claim for conversion alone seem unlikely to arise in prac-
tice. However, the Southern District of New York in the Portrait
of Wally case left open the possibility that art may be seized under
the "converted" prong of the NSPA.172 Expanding forfeiture law
in the cultural property context to encompass conversion as well as
theft would provide for an even more expansive standard for seiz-
ing such property under these provisions. Indeed, the Govern-
ment's failure to satisfy its pleading burden in the Mask of Ka-
Nefer-Nefer forfeiture case may have been decided differently had
the Government also pursued forfeiture under a theory of conver-
sion in addition to theft. 173 As a result of the court's analysis in
that case, it may have been easier for the Government to allege
facts sufficient to establish that the possessor had wrongfully de-
tained the mask sufficient to deprive the rightful owner of domin-
ion over the mask. 174 This may be an easier standard to meet un-
der the facts of that case, as opposed to alleging facts sufficient to
establish that the mask had actually been stolen.
170See, e.g., Gold Phiale, 184 F.3d 131.
171 United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 995 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing
Crabb v. Zerbst, 99 F.2d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 1939); accord United States
v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1966)).
172See Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940 (MBM), 2002 WL 553532, at
*23-24.
173 No. 4:11 CV 504 HEA, 2012 WL 1094658 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012).
174 Id. at *3.
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D. Does "Contrary to Law" in Section 1595a Encompass Foreign
as well as U.S. Law?
In the past decade, the question has arisen in civil forfeiture
actions under Section 1595a as to whether that provision encom-
passes the substantive laws of another nation as a basis for customs
forfeiture. Section 1595a(c)(1) provides that, "Merchandise which
is introduced or attempted to be introduced contrary to law ...
shall be seized and forfeited if it - (A) is stolen, smuggled, or
clandestinely imported or introduced." The relevant issue be-
comes whether "contrary to law" within the meaning of this provi-
sion requires that the law be part of the United States Code, or
whether the law could be the substantive laws of another nation.
The case United States v. One Lucite Ball of Lunar Materi-
al first raised this issue in the context of a cultural property forfei-
ture proceeding.' 75 In 1973, U.S. President Richard Nixon gave
the Republic of Honduras a piece of lunar rock attached to a
plaque as a diplomatic gesture; the rock was then stored in that na-
tion's presidential palace.1 76 The American claimant in the case
purchased this object from a retired Honduran colonel in Hondu-
ras, who claimed that the rock had been given to him after a coup
in that nation in 1973.177 The colonel did not possess any owner-
ship documents for the rock, but the claimant still paid $50,000 for
the object and took possession near the Miami International Air-
port in April of 1996.178 The U.S. government eventually seized
the rock during a sting operation by NASA officials in 1998.179
The Honduran government issued to U.S. customs officials a for-
mal letter requesting return of the rock because its export was in
violation of a number of Honduran national laws.
180
A law professor working for the district court in that case
stated in an expert report that (1) the rock disappeared from the
Honduran presidential palace between 1990 and 1994; (2) the rock
175 252 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
176 Id. at 1369.
177 id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 1370-1372.
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was part of Honduran national patrimony since 1973; (3) the rock
was property of Honduras as "national property of public use" un-
der Article 617 of the Civil Code of Honduras, and as such could
not be sold, owned, or prescribed legally by any private person; (4)
whoever took the rock from the presidential palace committed lar-
ceny under Honduran law; and (5) no legal theory could be assert-
ed that the claimant or any of his associates in Honduras could
have acquired good title to the rock. 181
The district judge held that evidence was sufficient to show
that the moon rock plaque was stolen in Honduras and then intro-
duced into the U.S. in violation of Section 1595a(c)(1)(A). 182 In-
terestingly, the court does not specify which law it relied upon
when determining that introduction into the U.S. was "contrary to
law." If an object is "stolen" within the meaning of another na-
tion's laws, it would also constitute stolen property under the
NSPA in the United States and would be subject to forfeiture un-
der Section 1595a with the NSPA satisfying the "contrary to law"
provision. However, the opinion in Lunar Material does not ex-
plicitly cite to the NSPA, nor does it indicate the relevant U.S. law
that had been violated. 83 This is problematic because the United
States would have authority under Section 1595a to seize property
classified as stolen under the laws of another nation, but it would
not have authority to seize property that violated some other provi-
sion of another nation's laws, for example export controls or cul-
tural patrimony laws.
In an even bolder example, the United States Attorney's
Office for the Southern District of Florida recently filed a com-
plaint to forfeit an Egyptian sarcophagus seized in Miami under
Section 1595a(c) and seems to clearly cite to Egyptian law in order
181 Id. at 1373-1376.
182Id. at 1378-1379.
183 The complaint in the Ka-Nefer-Nefer case was dismissed because the
Government had failed to specify the NSPA as the underlying law. No.
4:11 CV 504 HEA, 2012 WL 1094658, at *3, affirmed 752 F.3d 737 (8th
Cir. 2014). This suggests that either the United States Attorney's Office
or the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, or
both, require some citation to the NSPA.
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to do so. 184 The complaint in United States v. One Ancient Egyp-
tian Yellow Background Wooden Sarcophagus Dating to the Third
Intermediate Period alleges that the seized sarcophagus was con-
structed in Egypt between 1070 and 946 B.C.E., was authenticated
in 2007, and was then shipped from a Barcelona gallery to Florida
in 2008.185 The provenance document stated that the sarcophagus
had been in a private collection in Spain before 1970.186 The Gov-
ernment contacted an Egyptian official who stated that he was un-
aware that the Egyptian government had ever granted permission
for the sarcophagus to leave the country.
1 87
The Government's complaint cited a variety of Egyptian
laws dating from 1874 declaring, inter alia, government ownership
of antiquities found in the ground of Egypt, banning export of an-
tiquities, requiring that permits be granted by the government for
all excavations done within Egypt, and stating that antiquities are
to be public property of Egypt and cannot therefore be sold or pre-
scribed. 188 The Government relied on these factors, in addition to
the fact that no evidence could be produced that the defendant had
been allowed to leave Egypt, to establish its case for forfeiture un-
der Section 1595a(c). 189
The United States Attorney's Office in the Egyptian Sar-
cophagus case was undoubtedly applying Egypt's law as the "con-
trary to law" provision in Section 1595a. Unlike the Lunar Mate-
rial case, the United States has no comparable laws, namely
cultural patrimony laws, to those invoked on behalf of Egypt. The
fact that the complaint here does not cite to a U.S. law that was vi-
olated suggests, even more clearly than in the Lunar Material case,
that the Government was applying Egypt's own cultural patrimony
laws as the "contrary to law" provision under Section 1595a. This
is problematic because the United States has no authority to en-
force a foreign nation's cultural patrimony laws domestically. It
184 Complaint, United States v. One Ancient Egyptian Yellow Back-
ground Wooden Sarcophagus Dating to the Third Intermediate Period,
No. 09-23030-CIV-HUCK (S.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2009).
185 Id. at 1-2.
186 Id. at 3.
187 Id. at 4.
188 Id. at 4-5.
189 Id. at 6.
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could be argued that the court in Lunar Material was reading the
NSPA into the Government's complaint given that it was obvious
that the ball had been stolen from Honduras; the same could not be
done in the Egyptian Sarcophagus case because it was much less
clear when and even if the sarcophagus had been stolen from
Egypt. 190 Unfortunately, an observer does not have the benefit of
determining the legal sufficiency of this issue in the Egyptian Sar-
cophagus case because the district court judge entered default
judgment on December 30, 2009.191
A final and ongoing case from the Southern District of
Florida also clearly utilizes the law of another nation under the
"contrary to law" provision of Section 1595a. In United States v.
Three Artifacts Constituting Cultural Property From Peru, the
United States Attorney's Office for that district filed an in rem for-
feiture action under Section 1595a(c)(1)(A).' 92 In 2010, customs
authorities at Miami International Airport seized thirty-three arti-
facts from a Peruvian man traveling to the United States. 193 For-
feiture action against twenty-nine of those artifacts was brought
pursuant to the Cultural Property Implementation Act, 194 while the
three artifacts at issue were forfeited under Section 1595a(c)(1)(A)
as merchandise imported contrary to law that was either stolen,
190 See United States v. Broadening-Info Enters. Inc., 462 Fed. App'x 93,
97 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that "contrary to law" and "stolen, smuggled,
or clandestinely imported or introduced" are separate elements and must
be examined separately); but see United States v. One Tyrannosaurus
Bataar Skeleton, No. 12 Civ. 4760 (PKC), 2012 WL 5834899, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2012) (stating that although "contrary to law" and
"stolen, smuggled, or clandestinely imported or introduced" are separate
elements they may still be satisfied by the same statutory provision in
some instances, for example with regard to stolen property).
191 Default Judgment, United States v. One Ancient Egyptian Yellow
Background, Wooden Sarcophagus, Dating to the Third Intermediate Pe-
riod, No. 09-23030-CIV-HUCK (S.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 2009).
192 Complaint, No. l:13-CV-22585-JAL (S.D. Fla. 2013), available at
http ://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-flsd- 1? 13-ev-21697.
193 id.
194 19 U.S.C. § 2601 etseq. (2012).
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smuggled, or clandestinely imported or introduced. 95 The com-
plaint in this case cites a 1997 memorandum of understanding be-
tween Peru and the United States that designates certain classes of
objects as the cultural property of Peru, criminalize destruction or
unauthorized exportation of such objects from Peru, and provide
that ownership in such objects shall revert back to the nation of Pe-
ru if any attempt is made to export such objects.196
The complaint in this case cites no provision of the United
States Code establishing that these three artifacts were stolen with-
in the meaning of the NSPA or under any provision obligating the
United States to enforce the export controls or cultural property
laws of Peru.197 The complaint is explicitly referring to Peruvian
law when it states, "Based on all of the foregoing allegations ...
The defendant property constitutes merchandise which has been
introduced into the United States contrary to law, because it was
unlawfully exported from Peru, is now the property of the gov-
ernment of Peru, and has been stolen, smuggled, or clandestinely
imported or introduced into the United States."'198 The Southern
District of Florida, in recent years and perhaps uniquely among
federal district courts, has implied that the phrase "contrary to law"
under Section 1595a(c) extends to the substantive laws of another
nation.
The Southern District of Florida's interpretation of Section
1595a(c)'s "contrary to law" language as applying to foreign law
is troubling because laws are generally not thought to be given ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction unless explicitly provided for by stat-
ute.1 99 If the phrase "contrary to law" as it is used in Section
195 Complaint, supra note 192, at 1-2; see also United States v. Twenty-
Nine Pre-Columbian & Colonial Artifacts From Peru, No. 1:13-CV-
21697-XXXX (S.D. Fla. 2013).
196 Complaint, supra note 192, at 3, No. 1: 13-CV-22585-JAL.
197 The Government did not cite to the NSPA in its complaint, but pre-
sumably under the Lunar Material precedent the Government could have
proven a violation of the NSPA simply by establishing that the works
were stolen under the laws of a foreign nation.
198 Id. at 5.
199 See Morrison v. Nat. Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 253-54
(2010) (stating the general presumption that a law should not be read to
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1595a(c) is to be found to extend to the law of a foreign nation,
this further broadens the already expansive scope of forfeiture law.
Unlike provisions for restitution of antiquities under laws such as
the Cultural Property Implementation Act, Section 1595a is not
generally thought of as a means of returning wrongfully exported
cultural property to its country of origin.20 0 As the United States
does not have authority under its customs laws to enforce the ex-
port controls or patrimony laws of another nation, it is incumbent
upon the Government and the district courts to explicitly state the
U.S. law being violated under the "contrary to law" requirement of
Section 1595a.
E. Should Civil Forfeiture of Cultural Works Be Used Only In
Ongoing Criminal Cases?
A further issue of policy involves examining whether ap-
plication of Section 1595a should be limited solely to a remedial
measure in ongoing criminal investigations. Civil forfeiture of
cultural property presents a unique situation under forfeiture law.
The stated policy underlying statutes such as Title 18, Section 545
and Title 19, Section 1595a is to separate criminals from both the
instruments used to commit and the material gains of crimes.20 '
However, forfeiture of cultural property is generally aimed at re-
turning this property to the victims of crimes that occurred decades
or even centuries before the forfeiture action. This seems an odd
result if the intent of forfeiture is to prevent ongoing criminal ac-
tivity.2 02 This oddity is further compounded by the prevalent ap-
plication of Section 1595a in these types of proceedings. Section
1595a is part of the customs statute and customs laws, in theory,
are aimed at regulating entry of goods at the border. Application
provide extraterritorial jurisdiction as a matter of statutory construction
unless such an intent is explicit).
200 19 U.S.C. § 2601 etseq. (2012).
201 See United States Attorneys' Manual (U.S.A.M.) § 9-118.010 (State-
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of customs laws to recover cultural property that has been in the
country for some time seems somewhat counterintuitive.
The counterargument to this would be that the National
Stolen Property Act, for example, is intended to both deter the
original crime and to prevent subsequent transfers of that property,
which can enhance efforts of foreign nations to recover stolen
works.20 3 Another counterargument would be the policy underly-
ing the return of cultural property lost during the Holocaust to its
lawful owner, as in the Portrait of Wally case. There the theft in
that case happened more than fifty years before seizure and forfei-
ture of the portrait and the title-holder, Lea Bondi, passed away in
the 1960s. However, that case stood as an example of righting a
still-ongoing crime of the Holocaust.
Civil forfeiture proceedings can occur in tandem with a
criminal prosecution seeking forfeiture of the wrongdoer's proper-
ty as well. While nothing in the law prohibits conducting two for-
feiture proceedings simultaneously, prosecutors have expressed
concern regarding the administrative obstacles of such a posture.
204 The ultimate question remains, in addition to the specific in-
quiries into unsettled or unclear aspects of this statute, whether the
Government, through its United States Attorney's offices, is using
Section 1595a appropriately.
F. Is Section 1595a Being Used Appropriately?
The customs forfeiture statute, Section 1595a, is primarily
a means of preventing materials from entering the United States
that are not permitted for entry. Some argument can be made that
it is intuitive and necessary to extend the theoretical concept of the
"border" to encompass people or goods that have recently entered
the country, but are some distance or time removed from a physi-
cal border. It becomes less intuitive, however, when this concept
is used to seize objects that have been in the United States for
more than a short period of time (for example, for more than 20
years in the Davis case).
203 United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 994.
204 See Stefan D. Cassella, Overview of Asset Forfeiture Law in UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS' BULLETIN, Vol. 55, No. 6 (Nov. 2007).
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Case law under Section 1595a includes a conspicuous ab-
sence of non-cultural property cases. This may perhaps be due to
the fact that many non-cultural-property cases do not reach the lit-
igation stage, but the disparity is nonetheless curious. As men-
tioned in the section entitled "Case Studies - Non-Cultural Proper-
ty Forfeitures" in this paper, this absence may be attributable to
claimants in non-cultural property cases being less willing to con-
test a forfeiture, while claimants to cultural property may be more
willing to contest and seek return of the property. This may per-
haps be due to expectations of increased value of cultural property
works that does not correlate to non-cultural property objects.
Based on some of the characteristics of Section 1595a men-
tioned above, such as a lower burden of proof and lack of an ex-
plicit scienter requirement, it may be reasonable to suggest that
this provision is used as a sort of safeguard for cases involving cul-
tural property. Given that such cultural property often travels in-
temationally and is often owned by some foreign state, or some
foreign state party has an interest in the case (as was the situation
involving Austria in the Portrait of Wally case), it may be incum-
bent upon Assistant United States Attorneys prosecuting these
types of forfeitures to include "the whole kitchen sink" of relevant
forfeiture provisions in order to be assured of a win for the Gov-
ernment.
205
Given that the policy aim behind the enactment of CAFRA
was to curtail overzealous seizure and forfeiture by the Govern-
ment, the treatment of Section 1595a in cultural property forfeiture
cases begs the question whether anything has actually changed
with regard to overall aims, concerns, and policies behind civil for-
feiture. Congress clearly intended to exempt customs provisions
from the heightened requirements of CAFRA, but is this result cor-
rect as a matter of policy when the subject matter of a civil forfei-
ture under the customs statute is a work of cultural property?
Would extending the provisions of CAFRA, such as a preponder-
ance-of-evidence burden of proof on the part of the Government
and the right to an assertion of innocent ownership on the part of
205 See Izabella Redzisz, Note, United States v. Davis: 648 F.3d 84 (2d
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the claimant, place too much of a burden on prosecutors in cultural
property forfeitures under the customs statute? Evidence available
offers no clear answer to these questions.
VI. CONCLUSION & PROPOSALS
For much of its history, Section 1595a of the customs stat-
ute has been interpreted as a broad and useful tool to seize and for-
feit cultural and non-cultural property alike imported into the Unit-
ed States in violation of customs law. This paper addressed some
of the ways in which Section 1595a and other provisions relating
to cultural property forfeitures have been controversial, unclear, or
unique.
The history of Section 1595a reveals that this provision of
customs law began as a tool focused on preserving domestic com-
merce, health, and morality and has evolved into a law with a
much more global focus. A comparison of cultural property and
non-cultural property forfeitures suggests that the underlying pur-
pose in the cultural property cases is to return the property to its
rightful owner or nation. Cultural property forfeitures appear to
have a more international focus. The policy underlying non-
cultural property forfeitures, in contrast, seems to articulate the
original purpose behind Section 1595a, namely protecting domes-
tic health, safety, and wellbeing.
The applicable burden of proof the Government must assert
in a Section 1595a forfeiture remains the probable cause standard.
Some federal courts, for example the Eastern District of Missouri
in the Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer case, require heightened specificity
in the Government's complaint in a proceeding to forfeit cultural
property under Section 1595a, or, in the alternative, are unwilling
to grant the Government any slack when it fails to allege facts suf-
ficient to meet this more lenient standard.
Section 1595a arguably contains a scienter requirement,
which is suggested by language such as "smuggle" and "clandes-
tinely imported or introduced." The case law on this provision's
scienter requirement remains unsettled, however the Davis case
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The case law further remains unsettled as to whether the
National Stolen Property Act provides for something other than
"theft" - for example, "conversion." Such a possibility, however,
would greatly ease the burden of proof on the Government given
that it seems easier to prove that a work of cultural property was
converted rather than stolen. Whether or not such a possibility
constitutes sound policy is a matter for debate.
It is curious that Section 1595a may be satisfied, at least in
the Southern District of Florida in the Lunar Material case and its
progeny, by reference to foreign law alone and not also the Na-
tional Stolen Property Act or some other U.S. statute. Other dis-
trict courts, such as the Eastern District of Missouri and the South-
ern District of New York, would disagree that such an approach is
permissible. This is a prosecutorial issue in need of standardiza-
tion.
As a matter of policy, asserting Section 1595a in cultural
property forfeitures only as part of an ongoing criminal investiga-
tion may or may not be a wise course of action. Given that it is
possible that a work of cultural property may be in the United
States for some time without being challenged, it seems odd that
such presence would implicate the general policy behind forfei-
tures of curtailing ongoing criminal activity. The rebuttal to such
an argument is that the presence of the cultural property in the
country is often an ongoing crime in itself. Furthermore, the fre-
quent use of Section 1595a in cultural property forfeitures calls in-
to question the motivation and propriety involved in the litigation
strategy of United States Attorneys. Room for both reform and
clarification of the law certainly exists in the cultural property
realm of civil forfeiture law.
In addition to cultural property, another hot topic area in
civil forfeiture law is forfeiture of digital assets, such as domain
names. Seizure of digital assets by the Government raises a num-
ber of concerns complementing those addressed in this article. The
primary concerns of digital asset forfeitures are that they exist in a
sort of legal "grey" area and are thus not subject to traditional for-
feiture procedure. These types of forfeitures can also be too far-
reaching regarding the quantity of assets that can be simultaneous-
ly seized and do not provide enough protections under the law for
379
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innoent hird206innocent third parties. Proposals to curb abuse of digital asset
forfeitures generally recommend greater protection for third par-
ties, including the possibility of providing digital copies of seized
works to innocent users and to allow continued use of seized do-
main names by innocent users.
20 7
Many of the proposals for legal change in this area of the
law could be accomplished administratively through the Depart-
ment of Justice or the Customs & Border Protection bureau; fur-
ther legislation is likely not required. For example, in this paper's
discussion of Section 1595a(c)'s "contrary to law" provision being
satisfied by reference to foreign law, it is worth pointing out again
that the only United States Attorney's Office in the country that
appears to be pursuing this type of legal theory is the Southern
District of Florida. The suitability of applying foreign law to satis-
fy the requirement of Section 1595a(c) could be addressed by an
advisory opinion from the Justice Department informing United
States Attorneys around the country of the state of the law in this
area and recommending posture for further prosecution. It is un-
likely, in the opinion of this author, that the Justice Department as
a whole would take the position that enforcing another nation's
laws via the customs provisions of the United States is a permissi-
208ble, or at least advisable, course of action. Harmonization in
this field of prosecution nationally would be a productive step to
establish greater clarity in this area of the law and could be under-
taken by the Justice Department itself.
Another potential proposal may be an amendment to the
customs carve-out in CAFRA, which would allow for the possibil-
ity of a limited innocent-owner defense under Title 19 cultural
property forfeitures. This proposal largely mirrors that proposed
to curtail abuse of digital asset forfeiture and would fulfill a similar
206 Elizabeth Friedler, Note, Protecting the Innocent - The Need to Adapt
Federal Asset Forfeiture Laws to Protect the Interests of Third Parties in
Digital Asset Seizures, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 283, 311-15
(2013).
207 Id. at 310, 313-14.
208 This opinion assumes that no agreement exists between the United
States and the relevant foreign nation that would be subject to the Cul-
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objective with regard to forfeiture of cultural property under Sec-
tion 1595a. 20 9 This provision would be essentially a carve-out to
the carve-out. The provision would be worded to allow a claimant
to property that is artistic or ethnographic in nature, and which has
been in the possession of the claimant or his or her heirs for some
significant amount of time (say 20 years), to assert his or her inno-
cence in the forfeiture proceeding. Although potentially burden-
some, allowing innocent holders of cultural property works to as-
sert lawful ownership during forfeitures under the customs statute
may provide the system with a greater sense of fairness. It may al-
so curtail abuse of power that may, in theory, be present in cultural
property forfeitures under the customs statute. While the contours
of such a proposal are difficult to determine, a specified future
amendment allowing for assertion of innocent ownership may pro-
vide an additional check on the Government's power in these types
of civil forfeitures.
Section 1595a of the customs statute remains one of the
Government's most effective tools for seizing and returning cul-
tural property. While the Government's treatment of this provi-
sion entails a number of questions of law perhaps warranting both
greater scrutiny and amendment to limit abuse of power, use of
this provision will likely continue in effectiveness for some time.
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